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DE RUEHFR #1202/01 1771544
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3553
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEATRS/DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001202

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EUCOM PLEASE PASS AFRICOM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2018

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SUBJECT: AF/C DIRECTOR WYCOFF'S JUNE 9 PARIS CONSULTATIONS

REF: A. PARIS 1104 (NOTAL)

[B](#). PARIS 1100 (NOTAL)

[C](#). STATE 61842 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d
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[1](#). (C) SUMMARY: In June 9 meetings with AF/C Director Wycoff, French Presidency and MFA officials reiterated French differences with the U.S. on sanctions regarding Chad and Sudan, with the French arguing for pressure on all parties (including sanctions and the threat of sanctions) to encourage dialogue between the Chad and Sudan governments and their respective rebel opponents. However, the French reiterated their opposition to sanctions against Daoussa Deby Itno, claiming that his influence had decreased and that sanctions against him would make President Deby less likely to engage with Chadian rebels. On Rwanda, the French expressed general agreement with our policy on sanctioning certain FDLR elements. The French want to keep all parties committed to the Nairobi and Goma accords. They had no indications that the Lord's Resistance Army's presence in C.A.R. was expanding, but agreed to investigate that possibility, along with possible LRA ties to the Zande ethnic group, both of which they agreed could be troublesome. END SUMMARY.

[2](#). (C) AF/C Director Karl Wycoff on June 9 met separately with MFA AF/C DAS-equivalent Christine Fages, Great Lakes Desk Officer Laurent Chevallier, and Sudan Desk Officer Frederic Bouvier, and then with both Romain Serman and Remi Marechaux, the two line AF-advisors at the French Presidency. Acting AF-watcher attended.

[3](#). (C) Ref A reports the discussion of Sudan-Chad sanctions, including exchanges with French officials that occurred after Wycoff's visit. Ref B reports the discussion of the Rwanda FDLR sanctions issue. This message reports aspects of the meetings not reported in those messages.

Sudan/Chad

[4](#). (C) The main point the French made, with Presidential Advisor Serman leading, was disagreement with the U.S. over UN sanctions we are contemplating in connection with Sudan and Chad (see. e.g., ref C) The French said that the international community, using sanctions and the threat of sanctions, should work to promote political dialogue and reconciliation between Chad and its rebels and Sudan and its rebels. They disagreed with the U.S. decision only to sanction JEM and not promote JEM-Khartoum dialogue. They

also firmly opposed sanctioning Daoussa Deby Itno, for the reason that he no longer exercised the kind of negative influence he had in the past and because there is little evidence connecting him to JEM's May inclusion into Sudan. Sanctioning him without sanctioning Chad's rebels would incline President Deby not to deal with the rebels. Serman made clear in subsequent exchanges that the French were not calling for sanctions now on the Chadian rebels but rather to use the threat of sanctions to push the rebels to develop the contact that they do have with the Deby regime, with sanctions later a possibility should they not cooperate or not honor subsequent commitments. Ref A provides further elaboration on these central points.

15. (C) Both MFA DAS Fages and Serman expressed doubt about the utility of the Dakar Contact Group process but agreed that insofar as it provided an on-going effort to bring Sudan and Chad together, it should be supported. Sudan had at least expressed an intention to attend the meeting scheduled for June in Brazzaville but it was hard to determine what Sudan wanted out of the process. This and other peace processes, such as the Sirte talks, had yielded only desultory results so far. Wycoff noted USG efforts to encourage Chadian rebels to engage with N'Djamena, which had taken some positive steps, such as the recent positive changes to its government leadership, including the new Prime Minister. Fages and Serman both noted that the August 13 (2007) mechanism remained in place and could form the basis of reconciliation between N'Djamena and the Chadian rebels. (In a follow-up conversation, Serman said that one of France's goals was to encourage the rebels to do enough

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to qualify as "legal political parties" so that they could formally become a part of the August 13 process.) Wycoff noted the possibility that an ROC general, Jean-Michel Nokoko, had been identified as someone who could serve as a mediator between Sudan and Chad

16. (C) On political reform in Chad, Fages noted the expectation that legislative elections would take place in 2009, with presidential elections the next year. The international community had to begin supporting this process, beginning first with an acceptable census and voter registration. Fages said the French have told the Chadians they need to develop a new calendar for political reforms geared to the elections and taking into account that the reform process had been delayed by the February rebel insurgency. The new calendar had to reflect better today's reality while demonstrating a commitment to the elections. She stressed that France very much continued to push Chad on political reform and to investigate the fate of political opponents (two out of three of whom have since been located) during the February conflict. The French continued to advise Chad of the need for action on these issues, which could increase the possibility of political reconciliation. She said that providing outside assistance for monitoring the Chad-Sudan border would increase confidence across board, especially with the Chadian rebels, but no one wanted to take on this task. EUFOR's presence provides some assurances but it is not mandated to monitor the border. She said that the border issue was one outstanding issue not treated by the Dakar Agreement.

17. (C) Fages and Serman stressed the short window of opportunity the rainy season would provide and the potential for renewed conflict when the season ends. Although the JEM had been weakened, it could regroup quickly. Deby seemed to have strengthened his forces since the February fighting, with Wycoff noting the presence of new light tanks and two more Russian helicopters. Serman thought that we should strongly encourage the parties in both Chad and Sudan to make progress on political reconciliation immediately, so as to have processes underway by the time the rainy season ended. In a short meeting with Wycoff, MFA Sudan Desk Officer Frederic Bouvier repeated Serman's arguments on the

sanctions issue (see ref A), and stated unequivocally that sanctioning Daoussa Deby Itno was a "red-line issue" for France.

Rwanda

¶18. (C) In addition to the sanctions issue reported ref B, Great Lakes Desk Officer Chevallier noted that the Goma and Nairobi Accords had held together in the sense that the parties to them had remained parties. He said that there was now a "break in the action," with the next step the implementation of the substance of the Accords, particularly Nairobi, and followup action on the ground. There had been a welcome hiatus in large-scale combat and France was "pleasantly surprised" that the Accords, due to the continued participation of the parties, remained viable. Goma also provided an opportunity for the DRC and Rwanda to exhibit some good will to one another. The key priority remained the disarmament of the armed groups. He acknowledged little progress on this front with the FDLR.

¶19. (C) Chevallier described French efforts to promote security sector reform (SSR) in the DRC with the FARDC, which including training provided in Libreville and other projects, and the roles that MONUC and the EU could play, even indirectly. SSR was an area of U.S. interest, Wycoff noted, and he and Chevallier lauded the cooperation among defense attaches in DRC that was beginning to develop and that should be encouraged.

¶110. (C) In response to Wycoff's question about France-Rwanda relations, Chevallier stressed that the November 2006 report issued by Judge Bruguiere (France's former judicial expert on terrorism), which triggered Rwanda's severance of diplomatic ties with France, was his and his alone and did not represent GOF or MFA views. Chevallier noted the judiciary's independence. Since then, France has taken a number of opportunities to explain this to Rwanda, in an effort to return to a semblance of normal

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relations despite Bruguiere's report. President Sarkozy went to Rwanda in February 2008 and FM Kouchner has also presented the GOF's case to the Rwandans. There had been no dramatic change on Rwanda's part but the atmosphere had improved, Chevallier suggested, and there was regular contact between the two sides. Two new judges had succeeded Bruguiere in terms of judicial supervision of the case and perhaps they would reach different conclusions. Chevallier noted that Spain's judicial intervention in the 1994 genocide had taken some of the heat off France. He said as well that the Rwandans were also capable of providing exculpatory material that could go into the French files.

LRA

¶11. (C) Wycoff noted to Chevallier and Presidential Advisor Marechaux U.S. concerns that the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was moving into C.A.R., with the possible intention of establishing more than just a temporary presence there. An enhanced LRA presence was the last thing C.A.R. needed. Chevallier said that France had no information that would substantiate an LRA move into C.A.R.; the GOF believed that the LRA was isolated in the Garamba National Park in DRC, although he mentioned a possible split of LRA forces, with some in southern Sudan and perhaps in C.A.R. There was no precise information. Chevallier wondered whether Kony retained control over his followers. Both Chevallier and Marechaux said they could not confirm information Wycoff provided indicating that Kony was trying to increase LRA influence over the Zande ethnic group but said they would look into the matter. They both noted that LRA expansion into C.A.R. and developing ties with a hitherto unaffected ethnic group would be problematic.

¶12. (C) COMMENT: Wycoff's exchanges were particularly useful in allowing the French to exchange views, particularly with respect to the sanctions issue, directly with a Washington-based USG official. They were eager to have this opportunity and will continue to be, so long as this and similar high-profile issues remain in contention. END COMMENT.

¶13. (U) AF/C Director Wycoff has cleared this message. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
<http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:France>

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